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This paper examines two principal categories of manipulative behaviour. The term 
‘macro-manipulation’ is used to describe the lobbying of regulators to persuade them to 
produce regulation that is more favourable to the interests of preparers. ‘Micro-
manipulation’ describes the management of accounting figures to p roduce a biased view 
at the entity level. Both categories of manipulation can be viewed as attempts at creativity 
by financial statement preparers. 
The paper analyses two cases of manipulation which  are considered in an ethical context. 
The paper concludes that the manipulations described in it can be regarded as morally 
reprehensible. They are not fair to users, they involve an unjust exercise of power, and 
they tend to weaken the authority of accounting regulators. 
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Financial statements provide information that is used by interested parties to assess the 
performance of managers and to make economic decisions. Users may assume that the 
financial information they receive is reliable and fit for its purpose. Accounting 
regulation attempts to ensure that information is produced on a consistent basis in 
accordance with a set of rules that make it reliable for users. However, communications 
between entities and shareholders may be deliberately distorted by the activities of 
financial statement preparers who wish to alter the content of the messages being 
transmitted. This type of distortion is often referred to as ‘creative accounting’ or 
‘earnings management’. While opinions on the acceptability of accounting manipulation 
vary, it is often perceived as reprehensible.  
This paper will try to identify some manipulative behavior on the part of preparers of 
financial statements, taking into account some important ethical concerns. To achieve 
this, we will try to broaden out the usual definition of creativity in accounting to examine 
two principal categories of behaviour by the preparers of financial statements: 
 
-Macro-manipulation: When preparers become aware of a proposal to alter accounting 
regulation in a way that they feel will be disadvantageous to them, they may engage in 
lobbying to attempt to prevent the change. They attempt to bring about an alternative 
depiction of economic reality which is more favourable to them. In this paper we identify 
this type of behaviour as macro-manipulation.  
-Micro-manipulation: Creative accounting at an individual entity level involves preparers 
in altering accounting disclosures so as to create the view of reality that they wish to have 
communicated to users of the financial statements. This type of behaviour is described in 
this paper as micro-manipulation. 
 
In both cases, preparers are interested in creating the financial statements to suit their 
own purposes. Of course, they may genuinely feel that their view of economic reality is   4 
preferable from all points of view. However, it is also possible that they seek to distort 
the picture to meet their own needs. This paper identifies and discusses some significant 
ethical issues related to these manipulations of accounting reality.  
The paper proceeds as follows: first, the principal features of the current accounting 
regulatory landscape are described. The purpose of regulation, and the objective of 
financial statements are explained, and then the paper goes on to discuss the ways in 
which preparers of financial statements may confound the intentions of the regulators. In 
the next following section ethical issues of respect, fairness, justice and personal morality 
are discussed. We then consider two cases of manipulation. The first concerns a case of 
lobbying over a significant accounting issue in the United States. The second examines 
some recent evidence from Spain on the manipulation of financial statements that takes 
place at the entity level. The discussion then moves to re-consideration of the ethical 
issues identified earlier in the paper.  
 
The accounting regulatory background 
 
Accounting is regulated in most countries by two principal means: first, local laws 
relating to corporate and other bodies, and second, a system of accounting regulation in 
the form of standards. These are often promulgated by non-governmental organisations 
and foundations. Also, in recent years, a supra-national body, the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) has become more important in setting 
standards. The IASC came into being in 1973 via an agreement by several leading 
national professional accountancy bodies. In the period between 1973 and 2001 it grew in 
status, authority and membership. By 2001 it was poised to become the de facto supra-
national standard setter for much of the world. A key point was gained with the 
agreement, in 1995, with the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), that the IASC would be responsible for developing a set of ‘core standards’. If 
these were agreed by IOSCO they would be endorsed for use in all global markets. This 
endorsement took place in 2000. In 2000, the IASC decided to alter its constitution: from 
2001 the standard setting body was reconstituted as the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), to be responsible for issuing International Financial Reporting   5 
Standards (IFRS)
i. The IASB is currently in the process of addressing some highly 
complex technical issues that will, in due course, result in the publication of further IFRS.  
In 2001 the European Commission took the decision to present legislation that required 
the adoption of international standards by the listed companies of all member states from 
2005 onwards. Similar arrangements will shortly come into operation in Australia and 
New Zealandii. It can be expected that several national standard setting bodies around the 
world will gradually become less important, and may even eventually cease to exist. 
However, a national standard setter that is likely to exist in the foreseeable future is the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the USA. Until recently, it appeared 
quite possible that US standard setting might proceed autonomously without much regard 
to the activities of the IASB. However, a convergence project has been launched and it is 
likely that there will be some significant movement towards convergence over the next 
few years. 
 
The ‘infrastructure of financial reporting’ 
 
Schipper (2000) identifies four elements as forming part of ‘the infrastructure of financial 
reporting’:  
 
1.  The effectiveness of mechanisms for identifying and resolving interpretative 
questions. 
2.  The structure, processes, independence, expertise, incentives and resource base of 
the standards setting organisation. 
3.  Auditing and auditors. 
4.  Enforcement of accounting standards and the supporting regulations. 
 
In many national systems, one or more of these elements can be found to be relatively 
weak (for example, UK accounting regulation was relatively weak in respect of the first 
and second elements until the early 1990s when the national accounting regulatory 
system was overhauled).   6 
Although international accounting regulation can claim to possess the first two of 
Schipper’s (2000) four elements, it is vulnerable in respect of enforcement mechanisms 
and in respect of auditing and auditors. The IASB has to rely upon national systems and 
these are likely to be patchy and inconsistent. Fearnley and Macve (2001) identify some 
of the principal weaknesses prevalent in national systems of compliance: weak support 
mechanisms for auditors, lack of effective sanctions against directors, and differences 
between the legal framework and practice. Cairns (2001), summarising the findings of his 
International Accounting Standards Survey published in 2000, notes a substantial level of 
non-compliance with international standards amongst companies claiming to adopt them.  
Current developments in accounting regulation are proceeding rapidly, and the 
movements towards convergence and even international standardisation are welcomed in 
many quarters as helping to break down the barriers that hamper the operations of the 
international capital markets. However, there are some structural weaknesses in 
accounting regulation. This paper aims to illustrate some of the weaknesses that exist in 
respect of the role of the preparer, taking into account some important ethical concerns. 
 
The purpose of accounting regulation 
 
This paper is based in part upon the proposition that accounting regulation has an 
important function in society. It affects the allocation of economic resources, and so it has 
potentially wide-ranging effects upon social welfare and the balance of economic power 
between parties with often competing interests. Prior to the 1970s accounting regulatory 
bodies were not generally much concerned with the consequential effects of their actions 
on such matters as distribution and economic well-being. However, from the 1970s 
onwards, economic impact issues were recognised as being of increasing importance. For 
example, Zeff (1978) recounts several instances of behaviour on the part of lobbyists that 
made the Accounting Principles Board in the United States (the predecessor of the 
current Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB]) increasingly aware of the impact 
of its actions. He identifies several factors leading to the recognition of economic 
consequences as an issue of primary importance, including the following: 
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?? A general societal trend towards holding institutions accountable for their actions; 
?? The sheer scale of the potential economic impact of accounting regulation; 
?? Increasing awareness of the information economics and social choice literature. 
 
The growing awareness of economic impact issues informed the debate that took place in 
the last 30 years or so of the twentieth century about the establishment of a conceptual 
framework for accounting. The impetus for the establishment of a conceptual framework 
started in the USA where the first serious work was done on this type of p roject. 
However, conceptual frameworks have subsequently been promulgated elsewhere (for 
example, in Australia and the United Kingdom and at an international level by the 
International Accounting Standards Committee [IASC]). The frameworks define the 
fundamental purpose of financial statements, specify the parties who have a right to take 
an interest in the products of financial reporting and establish definitions of the key 
elements of financial accounting, such as assets and liabilities. The objective of financial 
statements is defined as follows in the Framework for the Preparation and Presentation 
of Financial Statements published by the IASC in 1989: 
 
“The objective of financial statements is to provide information about the 
financial position, performance and changes in financial position of an enterprise 
that is useful to a wide range of users in making economic decisions” (paragraph 
12).  
 
Accounting regulation, in the form of accounting standards, is based upon this objective 
which is stated in terms of utility to broadly defined groups in society. It is worth 
observing, too, that the user groups described in the Framework statement (and the other 
conceptual framework statements) are extensive in nature, covering investors, employees, 
lenders, suppliers, customers, governments and the final catch-all of the public. However, 
priority is awarded to the information needs of investors as the providers of risk capital to 
business.  
So, in summary, financial statements are geared towards decision-making by v arious 
different types of user, but the user group of most importance consists of the risk-taking   8 
investors. Accounting regulators are attuned to the needs of this group in particular, and 
are concerned with the economic consequences of the standards that they promulgate.  
 
Confounding their policies: preparers versus regulators 
 
As Zeff (1978) observed, an important factor in accounting regulation is the sheer scale 
of the economic impact of accounting rules. The choice of an accounting rule may have a 
very significant impact on, for example, reported profits. The level of profitability of a 
commercial entity potentially affects distributions to owners, wage and salary 
negotiations, levels of pensions funding, ability to borrow or to raise further risk capital, 
taxes paid and so on. The stakes are high, especially in the context of major national or 
multi-national corporations whose activities have consequential effects on the lives of 
many people. Regulators may attempt to take the economic consequences of their actions 
into account, but they are likely to be confounded in many ways. For one thing, the 
consequences of actions are not always predictable (this is a significant ethical problem 
in its own right that will be the subject of a separate paper). Another problem, however, 
and the one with which this paper is concerned, is that when the stakes are high there are 
considerable incentives for financial statement preparers to confound the work of the 
regulators. 
There are two principal means by which the intentions of the regulators can be 
confounded by preparers. First, preparers may lobby against proposals for rules that will 
have an adverse effect upon the financial statements prepared by their entities. Second, 
where strict application of the rules does not produce an accounting result that meets the 
needs of preparers, there is an incentive to misapply or to ignore the rule. This condition 
can pertain only where regulation is weak and/or is inadequately enforced. Both of these 
means involve manipulation, but the first is at the macro level of policy, and the second at 
the micro level of the business entity.  
The term ‘creative accounting’ is generally applied to the type of manipulation that takes 
place at the level of individual business entity. However, we characterise both the macro- 
and micro-activities as creative processes: in both manifestations preparers are busily 
engaged in managing financial accounting disclosures to their own ends. In both cases   9 
preparers assert the primacy of their own views o f the world and seek to dominate the 
reporting process with their partisan version of the truth. 
 
Ethical issues in accounting manipulation 
 
Many ethical ideas suggest themselves in connection with the manipulation of financial 
reporting. Because the system of accounting regulation shares many features with a 
system of law, we can look to values and ideas emanating from legal systems and 
systems of justice. Also, because such systems are societal constructs we can look behind 
them to issues of individual morality and to fundamental moral values such as 
truthfulness. Below we briefly explore three ethical issues related to accounting 
manipulation. 
 
Process values: respect for the law 
 
Lyons (1984) discusses the values that are exemplified in legal processes, and identifies 
respect for the law as an important element. “For example, well-designed procedures 
might encourage respect for law, and thus obedience to law, which many believe is a 
good thing” (p. 196). It may be argued that regulations that can be easily flouted, perhaps 
because they have been poorly drafted, or because enforcement mechanisms are 
inadequate, do not command respect. Lyons is discussing the rule of law, but the point 
applies perhaps with even more force to non-statutory regulation such as  accounting 
regulation. If it fails to command respect from those who are called upon to apply it, then 
regulatory failure is likely to ensue. In the context of the macro- and micro-manipulation 
of financial statements that we have identified as problematic in the existing system of 
accounting regulation, regulation loses authority if it is open to manipulation by a 
powerful interested party and if it cannot, in any case, be enforced. 
 
Injustice, unfairness and inequality 
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Accounting regulators, as we have seen, intend that financial statements should be useful 
to a wide range of users. The preparers of those financial statements act as intermediaries 
between the regulators and the users of the statements. They therefore occupy a powerful 
position as interpreters of the regulations, and, given the complexity of the business 
world, it is hard to see how some degree of interpretation can be avoided. Some, possibly 
many, preparers no doubt seek to interpret the regulation fairly and do not attempt to 
intervene in the regulatory process. However, it is clear that some preparers will adopt 
any means to hand to assert their own views. This can be seen as a misuse of the 
authority inherent in their position.  
Rawl’s (1972) conception of justice as fairness is of value here. In his theory of the social 
contract, he enunciates two principles of justice. Rawl’s second principle is that: “social 
and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both a) reasonably expected 
to be to everyone’s advantage, and b) attaching to positions and offices open to all”. This 
is not a version of communism: Rawls accepts that the distribution of wealth and income 
is not, and need not be, equal. However, this principle of justice requires that everyone 
benefits to some extent, although not necessarily to an equal extent. It would exclude the 
exercise of power to gain advantage for a particular group such as preparers of financial 
statements. 
This may seem too abstract a notion for application to practical activities such as the 
promulgation of, and compliance with, accounting standards. However, research 
evidence does tend to suggest that accounting manipulation is regarded with disapproval 
by informed professional groups in society such as auditors and accounting practitioners. 
Fischer and Rosenzweig (1995) found accounting and MBA students to be critical of 
manipulated transactions and the abuse of accounting rules. Merchant and Rockness 
(1994) found that accountants were critical of such abuses, and Naser and Pendlebury 




Moving from the general conceptions of injustice and unfairness, we can proceed to a 
more personal level where individuals make business decisions that may be more or less   11 
defensible. As Solomon (1993) points out: “We can no longer accept the amoral idea that 
‘business is business’ (not really a tautology but an excuse for being an unfeeling 
bastard)” (p. 206). Any decisions to lobby from a partisan point of view, or to dress up 
financial statements, are made by a group of individuals who are themselves moral 
agents. Business life and decisions are not exempt from considerations of morality. 
Solomon promotes an Aristotelian approach to business ethics based upon the virtue and 
good character of the individual.  
It is helpful to bear in mind the idea of individual responsibility for wrong actions, and 
the notion of good character when examining the rather amoral arguments employed to 
excuse accounting manipulative behaviour. A defence of creative accounting behaviour 
can be made which rests upon agency and positive accounting theories. Revsine (1991) 
discusses the ‘selective financial misrepresentation hypothesis’. He considers the problem 
in relation to both managers and shareholders, and argues that each can draw benefits 
from loosely drafted accounting standards that permit latitude in determining the timing 
of income. Shareholders can benefit from the fact that managers are able to manipulate 
earnings to ‘smooth’ income since this may decrease the apparent volatility of earnings 
and so increase the value of their shares. The fact that this involves deliberate 
manipulation and deceit is to be overlooked. Shareholders in this view become unwitting 
accessories to manipulation, but the agency theoretical supposition is that such behaviour 
is inevitable given the conflict inherent in agency relationships.  
In order to illustrate the nature of the problems identified so far, the next two sections of 
the paper provide detailed examples of accounting manipulation. The first examines a 
case of recent successful macro-manipulation in the United States where a highly 
significant policy decision by the principal accounting regulator was confounded by 
successful preparer lobbying. 
The second case looks at micro-manipulation at the individual accounts level. The case 
selected for examination is that of Spain, where, as will be seen, quite overt manipulation 
of earnings figures takes place.  
 
Goodwill accounting in the USA: a case of macro-manipulation 
   12 
In July  2001 FASB, the US accounting regulator issued two new standards: FAS 
Statement no 141 Business combinations and FAS Statement no 142 Goodwill and other 
intangible assets. FASB had devoted a great deal of time over a five year period to its 
project on business combinations. The principal concern was the status of pooling of 
interests (merger) accounting. This is a relatively complex area of accounting, but suffice 
it to note that pooling of interests generally produces combined statements that show the 
combination in much better light than under the alternative method of acquisition 
accounting. The Accounting Principles Board (APB), the predecessor body to FASB, had 
discussed the issue as early as 1968 with a view to eliminating the use of the pooling 
method of accounting for combinations. The initial result of the deliberations had been a 
preliminary recommendation to eliminate the pooling method altogether, but the APB 
was persuaded to retreat from this hard line position (according to Zeff (1978) the APB 
appeared “almost as a pawn in a game of political chess….as it abandoned positions of 
principle in favor of an embarrassing series of pressure-induced compromises”. (p. 59)). 
APB Statement No 16 instead established a set of 12 restrictive criteria to be met before 
the pooling method could be adopted. Although APB Statement No 16 restricted the use 
of the pooling method, according to Ayers et al. (2000), subsequent research suggested 
that “… managers prefer this accounting method and are willing to incur significant costs 
to avoid the recognition of additional assets and expenses associated with the purchase 
method” (p. 2).  
Pooling has been heavily used: one recent estimate is that in 1998 around of 55% of new 
business combinations (out of a total of 11,400 transactions) were accounted for under 
the pooling method (Ayers et al. 2000). FASB’s concerns about the issue included the 
following: 
 
?? The issue of comparability between groups of companies 
?? The heavy utilisation of regulatory resources upon the results of this method of 
accounting (FASB and SEC staff were spending ‘considerable time’ interpreting 
financial statements produced under the pooling method). 
?? The underlying substance of genuine pooling is rarely encountered in practice.  
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FASB therefore proposed, via an exposure draft issued in 1999, that the pooling method 
be completely outlawed, a proposal which was eventually to form a significant part of 
SFAS 141. Ayers et al. (2000), writing before the issue of the standard itself, had 
estimated, based upon examination of many transactions accounted for by the pooling 
method, that the elimination of the pooling method in US accounting would have 
significant economic consequences in that, for example, earnings per share and return on 
equity would deteriorate. 
The worsening of key ratios which results from recording combinations via the purchase 
method no doubt had much to do with corporate America’s reluctance to accept the 
elimination of the pooling method. The technology company Cisco (2000), a significant 
lobbyist against FASB’s proposals, provided the following list of dire consequences
iii 
which could follow FASB’s standard: 
 
?? Impeding of innovation and investment in new technologies; 
?? Slowing of overall economic growth of high-tech companies 
?? Significant reduction in merger & acquisition activity 
?? Impact on shareholder value and artificial reduction in corporate earnings 
?? Reduction in the number of small enterpreneurial companies able to develop or 
compete with established companies.  
 
One of the technical accounting issues that arises where acquisition accounting is carried 
out is that, in most acquisitions, there is a difference between the price paid for the 
business and the value of the net assets acquired. This difference is known as goodwill, 
and accounting for i t has occupied the minds of standard setters and preparers for 
decades. If it is treated as an asset and amortised, it can have a significant effect in 
depressing reported profits. An alternative accounting treatment involves treating 
goodwill as an asset, but not subjecting it to regular amortisation. Instead, the asset would 
be regularly tested for so-called ‘impairment’, that is, tested to see if its value has 
reduced. Only if it can be proved that it has lost value, would there be any effect on 
profit.   14 
Initially, FASB proposed to reduce the maximum acceptable period for amortisation of 
goodwill from 40 years to 20 years (which would mean that many businesses would have 
to set higher amounts of amortisation against their profits, thus reducing reported 
earnings and earnings per share). Strange to relate, during the course of discussions and 
hearings FASB’s view changed, and the Board decided to take a non-amortisation 
approach to goodwill. In FASB’s annual report the chairman reported this highly 
significant change in neutral terms: “Rather than have companies write off goodwill 
against earnings for up to 20 years as originally proposed, after thorough analysis we 
concluded that it would be more appropriate to test goodwill for impairment” (Financial 
Accounting Foundation, 2000) This was clearly a politically motivated concession to its 
critics. One of the principal reasons for fearing curtailment to the use of pooling was the 
obligation under the purchase method to account for goodwill and to take an earnings hit 
(albeit over a period of up to 20 years under the new proposalsiv). Under the FASB 
concession earnings will be affected only if there is an impairment in the value of 
goodwill. Much therefore depends upon the de facto effectiveness of the impairment 
requirements, but, given that goodwill valuation is such a subjective and difficult area, it 
seems likely that American corporations will be able to use the requirement as quite an 
effective way to manage their earnings.  
The story behind the issuing of standards 141 and 142 is interesting and instructive. It 
illustrates the intense political nature of standards setting in the USA (at one stage a bill 
was presented to Congress to place a moratorium on FASB’s ability to eliminate the 
pooling method of accounting
v). In order to be able to introduce the standard eliminating 
pooling FASB had to make a major concession by removing the requirement to amortise 
goodwill, thus creating an opportunity for some creative earnings management at the 
individual company level. It appears that the principal consequential outcome informing 
its action in this respect was the threat to its own survival as a standard setter.  
 
Creative accounting in Spain: a case of micro-manipulation  
 
As noted earlier in the paper, where strict application of the rules does not produce an 
accounting result that meets the needs of preparers, there is an incentive to misapply or to   15 
ignore the rule. Creative accounting (also known as income smoothing, earnings 
management, cosmetic accounting or financial engineering) has been variously defined 
as: 
 
“…the deliberate dampening of fluctuations about some level of earning 
considered to be normal for the firm”. (Barnea et al. 1976) 
“….any action on the part of management which affects reported income and 
which provides no true economic advantage to the organization and may, in fact, 
in the long-term, be detrimental”. (Merchant and Rockness, 1994) 
“…[involving] the repetitive selection of accounting measurement or reporting 
rules in a particular pattern, the effect of which is to report a stream of income 
with a smaller variation from trend than would otherwise have appeared”. 
(Copeland, 1968). 
 
Many research studies have tended towards the conclusion that creative accounting does 
exist (e.g. McNichols and  Wilson, 1988; Barnea et al., 1976; Dempsey et al., 1993; 
Dascher and Malcolm, 1970). However, there is also evidence to suggest that investors 
do not necessarily see through creative accounting (for example, Healy and Wahlen, 
1999, cite studies that find that creative accounting prior to equity issues does affect share 
prices). Also, there is some evidence that even quite clear signalling can be 
misinterpreted or ignored even by relatively sophisticated users (Breton and Taffler, 
1995). Furthermore, Dechow and Skinner (2000) argue that even if financial statement 
provide sufficient information to permit users to adjust for creative accounting, there 
would still be cause for concern because certain categories of investors have limited 
ability to process the information available in the notes to the financial statements.  
Amat et al. (2003) report a study identifying a set of quite overt creative accounting 
practices in some of the IBEX-35, stockmarket index which includes the 35 largest listed 
companies in Spain. The following occurrences were classified for the purposes of the 
study as possible indicators of creative accounting (in that they alter the impression 
presented to users by the financial statements): 
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?? Auditor report qualifications (in Spain, there is no requirement to restate the financial 
statements to reflect the effects of qualifications, although the effect is noted in the 
auditor’s report. This means that the view given by the financial statements can be, at 
least superficially, misleading); 
?? Special authorisations from regulatory agencies to adopt non-standard accounting 
policies (this is a peculiarity of the Spanish accounting environmentvi); 
?? Changes in accounting policy from one year to another (these are relatively common 
in Spain. The effects o f such changes have to be quantified and explained in the 
auditor’s report). 
 
The impact of these factors was assessed for each of the three financial years in the 1999-
2001 period. The aggregate impact on earnings of these practices amounted to 20% of 
total reported earnings. Table 1 summarises the findings:   17 
 
  1999  2000  2001 
% of IBEX-35 companies adopting one or 
more of the three practices 
40%  45.7%  25.7% 
Number of companies  14  16  9 
Reported earnings> adjusted earnings  5  11  7 
Reported earnings< adjusted earnings  9  5  2 
Table 1: IBEX-35 companies adopting practices indicative of creative accounting 1999-
2001 (Source: Amat et al. 2003) 
 
It may be noted that in 1999, a year when the economy was in a relatively buoyant 
condition, the reported earnings of nine firms were less than adjusted earnings. However, 
in 2000 and 2001 when the Spanish economy was affected by an economic downturn, the 
position is reversed. This result suggests the possibility that creative presentation of 
results could be related to g eneral economic conditions (a possibility flagged by 
Merchant, 1990). 
This study has some important implications for the enforceability of international 
standards. Listed companies in Spain, in common with those in other European countries, 
will shortly adopt international standards
vii. It seems, however, that the peculiarly Spanish 
approach to implementing accounting regulation will cease. Currently, supervising 
agencies, notably in the banking sector, may permit companies to adopt an accounting 
policy that contravenes current accounting regulation. These authorisations are provided 
as the result of successful lobbying by either a company or representative companies 
within an industrial sector
viii. Successful lobbying of this type illustrates the power and 
influence that preparers may exert over regulators. It seems highly unlikely that such 
power relationships will suddenly cease in 2005, and we may expect that Spanish 
companies will continue with their existing practices as far as it is possible to do so. 
Because the international accounting regulation is extremely weak in respect of 
enforcement, any enforcement that exists will rely upon the same national authorities that 
currently permit relatively slack accounting disclosure in Spain. 
   18 
Discussion 
 
The two kind of behaviors discussed above illustrate different manifestations of the 
power and influence of preparers of financial statements. What light do these cases shed 
upon the ethical issues in accounting manipulation that were identified earlier in the 
paper?  
The first case illustrates the relative weakness of the US standard setting body in dealing 
with a powerful preparer lobby. The contretemps over accounting for goodwill was not 
the first time that the authority of FASB has been challenged but the lobbying efforts that 
took place on this occasion were perhaps the most serious challenge that has been made 
to the authority of a national standard setter. The second case demonstrates that lobbying 
against regulation can become institutionalised. It is also clear that some significant 
manipulation of the appearance of major corporations’ income statements takes place in 
other ways too. Regulation in both cases becomes a negotiation between the regulator and 
the preparer of financial statements. The interests of the users of the statements are likely 
to be overlooked or ignored in such cases. The overt manipulation robs the regulating 
body and the regulatory process of respect and authority.  
User needs are ignored in the processes of manipulation at both macro- and micro- level 
that we have analysed in the paper. The exercise of power of the preparers is both unjust 
and unfair to the supposed beneficiaries of the reporting process. The fundamental 
objective of financial statements is deemed to be the provision of useful information for 
decision-making, but it appears that accounting regulation is too compromised to fulfil 
this purpose properly. Rawl’s justice as fairness principle would seem to be breached by 
the activities described in this paper. 
If we accept with Solomons (1993) that business life is not exempt from considerations of 
morality, then we can question the activities of accounts preparers as moral agents. In this 
respect, their actions are found wanting, and they cannot be defended except in the light 
of the rather dubious and amoral agency theoretical approach. The manipulative 
behaviours studied above employ no more sophisticated principle than the idea that 
‘might is right’. Further, it is reasonable to question the validity of activities involved in 
dressing up financial statements to present an appearance that is not fully justified by the   19 
underlying economic activity. This type of micro-level creative accounting is informed 
by an intention to deceive the recipients of financial statements, and can therefore be 




This paper has identified some manipulative behavior on the part of preparers of financial 
statements, taking into account some important ethical concerns. To achieve this, we 
have tryed to broaden out the usual definition of creativity in accounting examining two 
principal categories of behaviour by the preparers of financial statements: macro-
manipulation and micro-manipulation.  
At the macro-manipulation level, some preparers of financial statements are willing to 
engage in lobbying in an attempt to sway accounting regulators to produce rules that are 
advantageous to the interests of preparers. In doing so, they are likely to shift the 
attention of regulators away from the interests of users of the financial statements.  
At the micro-manipulation level, some preparers engage in manipulation at their entities 
in order to present a biased view of economic reality.  
Both categories of behaviour are likely to result in financial statements that may suit the 
purposes of the preparer but which are less than satisfactory from a user’s point of view. 
From an ethical perspective these manipulations can be regarded as morally 
reprehensible. They are not fair to users, they involve an unjust exercise of power, and 
they tend to weaken the authority of the regulators. Where regulation is breached with 
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Notes 
                                                  
i The predecessor body, the IASC, issued 41 standards over a period of almost thirty years. So far, the IASB 
has issued (at the time of writing) two IFRSs. 
ii In the case of Australia, the Australian Financial Reporting Council announced on 3 July 2002 that it 
would recommend that from 1 January 2005 the accounting standards applicable to companies would be 
those issued by the IASB (FRC, 2002). In New Zealand the Accounting Standards Review Board has   22 
                                                                                                                                                    
recommended to the government that IFRSs should be adopted by entities in both the public and private 
sectors from 1 January 2007, with the option to adopt as early as 1 January 2005 (ASRB, 2002). 
iii Subsequent events in the new technology market proved that several of these predicted consequences 
could occur without the assistance of FASB. 
iv A proposal which would have ensured convergence with the UK’s IFRS 10 and the IASC’s IAS 22. 
v A bill introduced by Representatives Dooley and Cox in the 106
th congress. 
vi A peculiarity shared by France. 
vii In addition, a decision has been taken by the Spanish government to extend the application of 
international standards to non-listed companies. In order to effect this change the Spanish Instituto de 
Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas (ICAC – Spanish Institute of Accounting and Auditing) plans to issue 
a new Plan General de Contabilidad (PGC – Spanish Accounting Plan) which will be adapted to IFRSs.  
viii This provides an interesting example of a hybrid between macro- and micro-manipulation. 
 
 